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ABSTRACT
Citizenship is a difficult concept to apply to non-Western societies.
The idea of citizenship has its origins in Ancient Athens and
Republican Rome, its modern form having been shaped by the
French Revolution and the nationalisms of nineteenth- and twenti-
eth-century Europe. Yet the idea of a social contract between mem-
bers of a society and their leaders is also found in non-Western
societies. The notion of integrated rights and duties of free indivi-
duals has existed for centuries among the Bugis andMakasar peoples
of South Sulawesi, Indonesia. In this paper, concepts and practices
developed by the Bugis and Makasar are compared against Classical
Greek and Roman citizenship, and the status of Bugis women is
briefly examined. In conclusion, it is argued that an important con-
tractual principle that has its origins in patron-client relations was
fundamental to the foundation of the South Sulawesi states and to
their economic and social well-being.
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The framing of ‘citizenship’ as a field of academic research in relation to contemporary
Indonesia – and, we suspect, in relation to most other Asian countries today – is
problematic, for at least three reasons. The first is that the term (Indonesian: kewarga-
negaraan, citizenship, civics) is simply not an important theme or concept in contem-
porary Indonesian public life and debate. To some extent the same can actually be said
of most countries, even in Europe: the frequent occurrence of the word citizenship in
public and academic discourse in recent years probably reflects concerns about migra-
tion and naturalization – that is, banal nationalism – more than it does interest in the
nature of citizenship and the rights and duties of citizens.
A second problem with citizenship is that it is not a sharp analytical tool, but a vague
concept, the definition and implications of which are much debated even by specialists.
All of the themes and relationships it may be said to encompass can also be approached
using different, and arguably more straightforward, terminologies: that of law, for
example, or rights, or equality, or democracy, or trust, or civility. Or if, as often
seems to be the case in practice, the aim is essentially to study how Indonesians interact
with the Indonesian state and its employees, then the toolkit of social and political
science surely includes sharper and more exact conceptual instruments than ‘citizen-
ship’ with which to tackle that job: clientelism, for instance, or social networks, or
interest groups.
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A third, and perhaps most serious, difficulty with citizenship as a way of under-
standing contemporary Indonesia is that it is not only a vague concept, but also
a normative one. Whatever people mean by citizenship, they always mean something
positive, and usually something epitomized by a Western model of some kind. This
makes it almost inevitable that research on citizenship in Indonesia today will conclude
either (1) that the country and its citizens should be understanding and practising
citizenship better than they do; or (2) that forms and practices of citizenship in
Indonesia are different from those that ‘we’ know in the West: more ‘informal,’ for
instance, or more ‘mediated’ by ‘personal social networks.’ The result, in other words,
must be either condescension, or something akin to orientalism, in essence a more
subtle and sophisticated form of condescension.
This combination of societal irrelevance, intellectual vagueness, and moral baggage
makes us skeptical about ‘citizenship studies’ as a field of enquiry as far as contempor-
ary Indonesian society and politics is concerned. In relation to the precolonial and
premodern past, however, we see some potential in the enterprise. Of course, the very
use of the term ‘citizenship’ in the anachronistic context of precolonial Indonesia
involves a questionable retrojection. But the fact that similarities can be identified
between certain indigenous Indonesian political systems on the one hand, and the
classical European polities that provide the archetypes of Western citizenship on the
other, makes premodern comparisons in this genre interesting. They have the potential
to call into question precisely the triumphalism and orientalism that modern compar-
isons tend to fertilize.
This is not to suggest that the parallel between classical European and precolonial
Indonesian polities is an exact one. What is attractive about making such a comparison is
that the precolonial Indonesian systems of ‘proto-citizenship’ sketched below cannot be
characterized as imperfect copies of Western models, in need either of conforming more
closely to those models, or of judging by radically different standards. Rather, they reflect
independent, indigenous, self-referential historical developments that, while owing noth-
ing to Western inspiration, proceeded in surprisingly familiar directions. Conversely, to
reflect on the historical origins of Western citizenship is to understand that the egalitarian
concept we know today actually has its roots in European societies that were more, not
less, saturated with clientelism and inequality than contemporary Indonesia is.
Classical prototypes of western citizenship
It was with the French Revolution that citizenship became a common currency of
political thought and action in Europe. But citizenship’s roots, or at least its persistent
inspiration, lie much further back in history, in classical Greece, especially the Athenian
democracy, and Rome, especially the mid- to late Roman Republic (circa 300–30 BCE).
For our purposes it is worth beginning by summarizing the main features of both of
these political systems. The following sketches draw in particular on the outlines by
Thorley (2004) and Mouritsen (2015).
Originally a monarchy, by the seventh century BCE the city-state (polis) of Athens
was governed by a council of nine rulers or arkhon, drawn from the leading noble
families of the four ‘tribes’ into which the population of the city’s hinterland was
divided. There was also a general assembly of the free (non-slave) populace, although
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its role and powers at this date are unclear. In 694 BCE the office of arkhon was opened
to non-noble Athenians, within a certain property class, and a new court system was
introduced in which members of all propertied classes potentially acted as jurors, and
through which any citizen could in principle contest a decision made by an arkhon.
In 508 BCE Athenian democracy reached its classical form when the political
functions of the ancestral tribes were abolished, and the power to make state policy
was formally vested in the general assembly (ekklesia) of citizens, or members of the
political community (politai). A new executive council, the boule, was also established.
This consisted of 500 representatives of the propertied classes, chosen by lot, and each
limited to a one-year term of office. Within the boule there was a standing committee of
50 men, rotating monthly, with a new chairman chosen by lot every day. Concurrently
with these political reforms the legal system was also further developed, with a pool of
6,000 citizen jurors now being chosen by lot each year. The arkhons, however, retained
important judicial functions.
Citizens were divided into four property classes, the boundaries between which were
nominally determined by how much wheat a man’s estate produced annually. Members
of the lowest free class, the thetes, who made up at least half of the citizenry, were not
eligible to become members of the boule. The general assembly was by definition open
to all citizens, but it appears that only about 6,000 of them could have participated in
any one meeting, out of a citizen population of between 30,000 and 50,000. Because
women, slaves, and resident foreigners were excluded from citizenship, citizens prob-
ably made up no more than 30 per cent of the total adult population. From 450 BCE
onward, Athenian citizenship was confined to men of whom both parents were
Athenians.
Rome too was at first a monarchy. At the end of the sixth century BCE this was
replaced by a republic, initially under the rule of a council of noble families, which was
to become a senate of roughly 300 members. Later, a separate Plebian Assembly, led by
people’s representatives or tribunes, was added to protect, and legislate on behalf of, the
lower classes. Election of the twin heads of state (consuls), however, remained in the
hands of a third group, the Centuriate Assembly, a predominantly aristocratic institu-
tion based originally on the contribution to the Republic of military services of various
kinds. This assembly was organized in a plutocratic way, such that the votes of rich
members carried systematically more weight than others. A persistent feature of the
Roman political process was block voting, with citizens (cives) acting in groups of
various kinds – territorial or ‘tribal’ as well as military and class-based – to approve or
(occasionally) disapprove the election of new officials and the adoption of new laws and
policies.
As in Athens, a leading principle of citizen politics was direct participation in the
public assemblies. However, there was also an indirect component, involving the
election of representatives, that differentiated it strongly from Classical Greece.
Practical constraints, most obviously the size of the venues used for political meetings,
meant that no more than a fraction of Roman citizens – probably 25,000 at most, out of
a citizen population of more than a million in the late republican period – could take
part in any one public decision. Meetings of the various assemblies, moreover, were
much less regular than in the Athenian case, and the officials who convened them seem
to have played a stronger and more predictable role in shaping their outcomes. Roman
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politics in this period was much influenced by relationships of clientela, or patronage,
between individual power-holders and their clients or dependents among the citizenry,
who could be relied upon to support their political endeavors. As a result, Republican
Rome has been characterized as ‘an oligarchy characterized by deference and depen-
dence’ (Balot 2017, 6).
Roman citizens nevertheless possessed well-defined rights, including the right to vote
(subject, as explained, to property qualifications) in one or more of the Roman
assemblies (ius suffragiorum), the right to stand for public office (ius honorum), and
the right to hold property and conclude commercial contracts (ius commercii) under
Roman law, access to which was fundamental to citizenship. Other legal rights of
citizens included the right of appeal against a magistrate’s decision. Formally speaking
Roman citizenship included women, although female citizens had no political rights.
Slaves, as in Greece, were excluded from citizenship, although it was possible for a slave
to be freed and thereby enter the political community. Quite early in the Republic,
Roman citizenship came to be granted to people whose parents had not been citizens;
this applied firstly in Italy and eventually across the Empire – the possibility of foreign-
ers becoming Roman citizens is an important difference from the Greek view. Roman
citizenship was thus more open in character than its Athenian counterpart and became
progressively more so, but also less participatory in character, as the Roman state
expanded geographically and into the Imperial age.
Although in some ways quite different, the Athenian and Roman polities as
described above displayed a number of common features. Their systems of government
were collective and in theory participatory, especially in Athens with its radical democ-
racy of rapidly rotating citizen office-holders. In Rome the system of block voting by
class and region in multiple assemblies, the infrequency of meetings and elections, and
the prevalence of clientelism, made for much less direct citizen control. In both cases
the political community (polis, civitas), despite its democratic aspects, was exclusive of
a large part of the population: slaves, women, and to a greater or lesser extent, resident
foreigners. Even among citizens, political rights in both Athens and Rome varied
according to class and wealth. In both cases, finally, government was based on, and
in principle bound by, law, the relation between citizen and state being legal or
contractual in character and providing the citizen with statutory freedoms.
Indigenous political organization in South Sulawesi
South Sulawesi, home of the Bugis and Makasar ethnic groups, has a history of
political and economic autonomy somewhat unusual in the Indonesian context.
Although its main port city, Makassar,1 in the early seventeenth century one of the
most important in Southeast Asia, was captured and brought under Dutch rule in
1669, most of the peninsula remained substantially independent from European
power until the beginning of the twentieth century. During this period, and to
some extent up to the present, its peoples became known as dynamic maritime
traders and adventurers, forming commercial, cultural and political diasporas that
spanned the whole Indonesian archipelago and beyond. One Bugis subgroup, that of
Wajo, developed and implemented its own written code of commercial law, valid
throughout its overseas diaspora. Nevertheless, the majority of Bugis and Makasar
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people remained farmers, cultivating wet rice in valleys and dry-field crops on the
intervening hills.
From the fifteenth century or earlier, the lowlands of South Sulawesi were divided
into political and territorial units which historians have conventionally called king-
doms. By the seventeenth century, the six largest of these were Luwu, Soppeng,
Sidenreng, Bone, Wajo, and the twin polity of Goa-Tallo, the port of which was
Makassar. Each was about the size of an English county and comprised some tens of
thousands of inhabitants. The following sketch of the development and institutions of
these states draws in particular on the work of Caldwell (1995), Druce (2009), Pelras
(1971, 1996), Reid (1998, 2000), and Wellen (2014).
Like ancient Greece and Rome in earlier periods, South Sulawesi developed its
institutions of state on the basis of local social structures and indigenous religious
traditions, and from a starting point of local, decentralized political organization. In
contrast to Java and the Malay world, the kingdoms of South Sulawesi were unin-
fluenced by Indic models of sacral, universal kingship. Islamic influence came relatively
late, the first significant conversions taking place in the early seventeenth century, some
four hundred years after the earliest evidence of state formation. When the first
Portuguese visitors observed them in the sixteenth century, the Bugis and Makasar
kingdoms were ‘rooted in an animist culture still in full vigour’ (Reid 2000, 440). Again,
like Greece and Rome, those states developed under conditions of considerable eco-
nomic openness and freedom, as reflected in the international commercial importance
of Makassar before the Dutch conquest, and in the success of the Wajo Bugis as
maritime traders from the eighteenth century onward. Evidence of earlier trade rela-
tions is provided by the widespread distribution in South Sulawesi of Chinese and
Southeast Asian ceramic tradewares dating from the thirteenth century onward
(Hadimuljono and Macknight 1983) and by rarer finds of Indian block-print textiles
dating from the fourteenth century onwards (Guy 1998).
A further parallel with ancient Greece and Rome lies in the fact that despite their
decentralized political organization, the societies of South Sulawesi were strongly
stratified. Very broadly speaking, there were three social classes. At the top of the
hierarchy was a small aristocracy that laid claim to its eminence through an ancient
Austronesian myth of divine origin (Caldwell and Wellen 2015). This noble group was
subdivided internally into status ranks according to degrees of ‘white blood,’ or purity
of descent from divine founding ancestors. As in early Athens and Rome, nobles
monopolized the most important positions of power. Below the nobles were the free-
men (Bugis: tomaradéka). As with plebian citizens in republican Rome, the freedom of
the tomaradéka was constrained to a varying extent by their involvement in clientelistic
relationships with individual members of the noble class. Asymmetrical patron-client
relationships between nobles and freemen were based on an unequal exchange of
services, in which the former provided the latter with physical protection and monetary
(or other) credit, in return for political support and (paid or unpaid) labour (Pelras
2000, 394). In circumstances of heavy indebtedness, such relationships could lead to the
degradation of a free person to slavery (Sutherland 1983: 275, 280). Slaves (Bugis: ata)
made up the third and lowest social class. Sutherland (1983, 263) describes them as
‘those who “belonged” to someone, who had limited social and legal rights, and could
be bought and sold.’
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Despite – or perhaps precisely because of – the porousness of the boundary between
the free and slave classes, it would appear that among the Bugis the existence of that
boundary gave rise to a strong collective interest in defining the rights and liberties of
members of the free population vis-à-vis the servility of the non-free. One Bugis
kingdom in particular – Wajo, on which much of the following analysis is based –
acquired a reputation as a stronghold of personal liberty. The contrast in this respect
with Java, where both the institution of slavery and the idea of individual freedom were
much less developed than in South Sulawesi, has led Reid (1998, 141) to argue that in
Indonesian as well as European history, ‘freedom is most valued where it is most
denied.’
Within each Bugis polity the highest authority was exercised by a monarch, elected
by a council of nobles, reminiscent of the Athenian arkhon, who chose one of their
peers as head of state. This council moderated the ruler’s powers and had the right to
dismiss the office holder in the event of gross abuse of authority. In Wajo the council
consisted of six members; in Bone and Sidenreng, seven; in Gowa, ten; and in Luwu,
twelve. The composition of the council reflected the geographical structure of the polity,
with each member representing one of the smaller territorial units out of which the
kingdom, whether by force or threat of arms, or through voluntary confederation, had
originally been constituted. In Wajo, for example, two members of the six-person ruling
council (the ‘Six Lords’), one a civil official and the other a military leader, came from
each of three major regional divisions called limpo.2
In 1840, James Brooke, the future ruler of Sarawak, visited South Sulawesi and wrote
a journal of his experiences there (later edited by naval officer Rodney Mundy) that
reflects his great interest in the political constitutions of the Bugis kingdoms.
Particularly striking is Brooke’s first-hand account of the workings of Wajo’s elective
monarchy.
This government consists of six hereditary rajahs, three civil and three military chiefs, one
military chief being attached to each civil one. With these six officers rests the election of
a head of the state, entitled the aru matoah [arung matoa], who may be considered an
elective monarch, exercising during his reign all functions of the chief magistrate, checking
and controlling the feudal lords, deciding cases of difference, and conducting the foreign
policy of the kingdom. (Mundy 1848, 62.)
The powers of the Six Lords were further checked and balanced by a second, larger
aristocratic council of state called the arung patampulu or ‘Forty Lords.’ This second
council was controlled in turn by three powerful non-noble officials whom Brooke, in
a direct reference to classical Rome, called ‘tribunes of the people.’
Below the six great chiefs, is a council, or chamber of forty arangs, or nobles of inferior
rank, who further serve to modify the feudal state, and are appealed to in all cases of
importance or difficulty. The rights of the freemen are guarded by three pangawas
[punggawa], or tribunes of the people, one being attached to each department of state
[limpo]. [..] The powers of these pangawas [..] is considerable. With them only it rests to
summon a meeting of the council of forty. They possess the right of veto to the appoint-
ment of an aru matoah. Their command alone is a legal summons to war, no chief or body
having right, or even authority, to call the freemen to the field. (Mundy 1848, 62–63)
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This system of popular representation through tribunes was apparently formalistic as
much as electoral, with descent affecting the choice of punggawa just as it did that of
members of the two ruling councils. Nevertheless, the tribunes do seem to have had
direct connections to, and lines of communications with, the free commoner
population.
The election of these pangawas rests with the people, and is generally hereditary. Each
town and village has a number of freemen called the orang tuah, who administer its
internal concerns, and are responsible to the chiefs for the dues in their power to exact.
(Mundy 1848, 62–63)
The democratic aspect of Wajo political institutions did not end with permanent com-
moner representation in the councils of state. From time to time, on occasions when the
Council of Forty was divided over an important issue, a general deliberative assembly was
convened by the tribunes in which ‘respectable’ commoners were entitled to participate.
Besides the constitution of the government here detailed, there is a general council of the
people, composed of the heads of villages and all the respectable freemen, who are
convened on extraordinary occasions, to state their opinions and discuss important
questions, without, however, having the power of arriving at a decision. It is necessary
for the council of forty to be unanimous in their decrees. Failing this, the general council is
convened through the pangawas, and the ultimate decision of the question rests with the
aru matoah, or chief magistrate. (Mundy 1848, 63)
Since ultimate power in such situations rested with the arung matoa (ruler) rather than
with the assembly, the system clearly stopped short of popular sovereignty.
Nevertheless, it is easy to see in this ‘participatory democracy of last resort’ (our
expression) the spirit, if not of the Greek ekklesia, then at least of the Roman Plebian
Assembly, convened by popular tribunes to give political voice to all those Roman
citizens whose commoner status barred them from direct participation in the aristo-
cratic assemblies. And while Wajo was probably the most democratic of all the South
Sulawesi kingdoms, others also maintained institutional checks and balances, and in
times of crisis tended to incorporate a system of direct popular consultation.
Rights, freedoms, duties, contracts
Evenmore reminiscent of European antiquity was the system of formal rights and freedoms
enjoyed in Wajo, and to a lesser extent in other Bugis and Makasar kingdoms, by all
freemen. These rights were enshrined not only in political custom and oral tradition, but
also in written historical texts that effectively functioned as constitutions. Another genre of
writings, called latoa (‘the ancient ones’), records the advice and wisdom of rulers and
statesmen of the past. These texts, which date from the eighteenth century or earlier,
contain a wealth of information on the principles and practices of Bugis society and its day-
to-day governance. Noorduyn (1955, 54–55), one of the few scholars to have examined
them, summarizes what the Wajo latoa have to say about the rights of freemen:
The rights and freedoms of the Wadjorese are formulated quite consistently in the manu-
scripts [. . .]. According to the historical texts that mention them, they were established by
the first Arung Matoa. Almost without exception, the texts list three or four provisions as
constituting ‘the freedom,’ amaradékang, of the Wadjorese.
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(1) Their persons, families, slaves and property cannot be confiscated [. . .]; nor can
they be unjustly punished; if they incur punishment, then no others can be
punished along with them [. . .]; and they cannot be subjected to the will of
a tyrannical ruler.
(2) The door of Wadjo’ is always open to them to enter and leave at will; they are
not impeded in their movements [. . .].
(3) They [. . .] do not pull out each other’s house poles, move each other’s houses,
except in the case of thieves or violent criminals [. . .].
(4) The free [Wadjorese] cannot be prevented from concluding a mutual agreement,
appadaelorĕng, provided this is authenticated by witnesses.
The core rights of the free population, in other words, were: security of person and
property; access to (individual, not collective) justice; freedom of movement and
residence both inside and outside the polity; and freedom of (commercial) contract.
It was to these freedoms that Brooke attributed the success of the Wajo in commerce,
and their ability to establish commercial colonies as far afield as Borneo (Mundy
1848, 89).
The first of the rights specified by Noorduyn, security of person and property, was
fundamental to the subsequent three. By modern standards, property ownership in
precolonial Wajo was not extensive: arable land was freely available, to be cultivated
against payment of a ten percent government tithe; houses – even those of nobles –
were constructed of wood and nipah palm and could be dismantled and moved to
a new location if required. Private wealth existed mainly in the form of money and
portable valuables, as well as in slaves and followers. The protection of such capital
against unlawful seizure was, however, vital to commerce. Among the Wajo diaspora,
the institutional framework for long-distance trade was further elaborated in the written
compendium of maritime and trade law attributed to Amanna Gappa, a seventeenth-
century leader of the Wajo trading community in Makassar (Tobing 1961). The second
freedom, the right to move freely from place to place, is an important element of
modern citizenship. Roman citizenship also included this right, as witnessed by the ease
with which St Augustine and St Paul, both Roman citizens, travelled throughout the
Empire. The founding constitution of Sidenreng (Mula tattimpanna Sidenreng) specifies
the right of freemen to move without restriction within the kingdom’s boundaries.
Now it is the custom that we eight matoa [chiefs] do not close our gates to the people of
Sidenreng. Our people go wherever they wish and may come and go as they please. The
eight gates [divisions of Sidenreng] will remain open to them. [. . .] If they no longer feel
content in their village they may go to live with one of their other seven mothers. (Druce
1999, 45)
The third right on Noorduyn’s list, the right not to have one’s house dismantled or
moved against one’s will, appears to be an amalgam of the first two – perhaps in the
context of intra-village disputes, which were required to be settled by due process.
The last and at first sight rather minor right – that to enter freely into binding legal
contracts with others, with which no ruler may interfere – is particularly interesting, for
two reasons. The first is that it exactly parallels the Roman ius commercii and reflects
the importance of commerce and economic freedom in both precolonial Bugis and
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classical European civilizations. The second is that it exemplifies a broader emphasis in
South Sulawesi culture on mutual contract as a principle of social and political
organization. Reid (2000, 442) has noted ‘the readiness of Bugis and Makasarese
communities to regulate their affairs by contracts between two parties, each recognizing
the other’s rights.’ A Wajo saying emphasizes the binding nature of contractual obliga-
tion, by comparison with political decisions that could on occasion be disputed. Even
the ruler was unable to contest the law of contract:
One may contest the decision of the ruler, but not that of the [ruling] council.
One may contest the decision of the council, but not that of the [commoner] elders.
One may contest the decision of the elders, but not that of a mutual agreement
[appadaéloreng]. (Pelras 1971, 174)
Like Greek, Roman, and modern citizenship, free (maradéka) status appears to have
brought with it obligations as well as rights. The most important duty incumbent on the
tomaradéka seems to have been the performance of military service. The sheer number
of warriors that could be raised in a single muster – some ten thousand from Wajo
alone in the seventeenth century – suggests that armed support of the state and its
policies was obligatory on every freeman (Andaya 1981, 202). The fact that in Wajo,
only the non-noble punggawa members of the Council of Forty (Brooke’s ‘tribunes of
the people’) had the right to summon the freemen to war implies a direct and reciprocal
relationship between the duty to fight for the state, and the right to be represented in
the councils of state.3
Political authority and the enforcement of rights
Political authority in South Sulawesi was respected partly because relationships of
power were understood as having resulted from mutual agreements made in the
ancestral past between ruling lineage founders and their followers. In Western terms,
the prevailing theory of state resembled not the medieval or early modern ‘divine right
of kings,’ but rather the ‘social contract’ of Enlightenment political philosophy.
The opening section of most chronicles includes a passage in which a social pact is
concluded between the ruler and the people, whose leaders declare in a formula mirrored
in many texts: ‘It is you that we take as our lord. Protect us from sparrows, that we be not
plundered; bind [us like] rice sheaves that we be not empty; put your blanket on us that we
be not cold. [..].’ This is followed by a statement about reciprocal rights and duties, in
which the ruler is warned about the consequences of his possible misdeeds [..]. This is
a contractual relationship that can be deemed void should either side fail to observe its
observations [..]. (Pelras 1996, 105–106)
Although the obligations incumbent on rulers may not always have been met or
successfully enforced, they were certainly not just theoretical. The recorded histories
of South Sulawesi are rich in episodes in which rulers are described as being legally
deposed and punished for abusing their powers and failing to respect the rights of their
free subjects (Henley and Caldwell 2008, 273–74).
The latoa text Petta matinroé ri Lariang-Bangngi (‘Our lord who is buried at Lariang-
Bangngi’) identifies five methods by which public officials, and even apical rulers, could
be held to account. The first (mangnganro ri ade’) was by submitting a petition to the
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ruler or the ruling council. The second (mapputane’) was for community leaders (ulu
anang) to organize a public gathering in front of the royal meeting hall and request an
audience with the ruler or council. The third (mallimpo ade’) was a sit-down protest in
front of the palace or meeting hall, with participants bringing food sufficient for several
days. No weapons were to be carried and the protest was to be strictly peaceful. The
fourth method (mabbarata) was a potentially violent protest by a group that felt its
rights to have been violated by officials of state, by the ruler’s relatives, or even by the
ruler himself. This kind of protest, which carried with it an open threat of civil
disobedience or war, was led by powerful and respected families, and negotiations
were handled directly by the ruler. The fifth and final method of protest was the
voluntary exodus of a group of people to a neighbouring country under the leadership
of a powerful family. This decampment, called mallekke’ dapureng (literally, ‘to carry
one’s kitchen on one’s head’), was the last resort in the event of a serious grievance. The
ruler was forbidden from preventing such an exodus, as this would contravene the right
to free movement and abode (Mattulada 1985, 448–49).
Nascent citizenship in historical context
When considering the idea of a ‘nascent citizenship‘ in South Sulawesi, it is salutary to
recall that Bugis and Makasar kingdoms were no parvenu states. Their roots lay in
territorial coalitions – coalitions based on sworn treaties, not on personal relations
between leaders – forged as early as the thirteenth century (Druce 2017, 19).
Archaeological evidence confirms the early sophistication of the region’s social and
political organization (Bulbeck 1992; Bulbeck and Caldwell 2000; Bulbeck et al. 2018;
Hakim et al. 2018). By the sixteenth century the South Sulawesi states had reached a level
of complexity comparable to those of Anglo-Saxon England, featuring large, stable,
constitutionally organized polities with defined borders – a far cry from the volatile,
borderless precolonial states of fashionable scholarly imagination (Druce 2017, passim).
European visitors to precolonial South Sulawesi spoke well of its institutions, and of the
civility of its people. In 1610 an English visitor described the inhabitants of independent
Makassar as ‘a very good people to deal withal and to live by: and which hold good right and
justice, and order after their manner’ (Reid 2000, 433). At the end of the eighteenth century
a Dutch admiral praised Gowa as a state in which crimes were ‘punished according to laws,
and not by the arbitrary will of the monarch,’who indeed was himself ‘subject to the laws of
the land’ (Stavorinus 1798, 205). Even James Brooke, writing in a new century of European
self-confidence, expressed admiration for how the government of Wajo respected what he
explicitly called the ‘rights of citizenship’ of its people.
We cannot fail to admire in these infant institutions the glimmer of elective government,
the acknowledged rights of citizenship, and the liberal spirit which has never placed
a single restriction upon foreign or domestic commerce. That a people advanced to this
point would gradually progress if left to themselves [..] there is every reason to believe [..].
(Mundy 1848, 66)
Considering that in Brooke’s own country the national electorate had until less than
a decade earlier (up to the Great Reform Act of 1832) consisted of less than 15 percent
of the adult male population, the future White Rajah’s praise for Wajo’s ‘glimmer of
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elective government’ may be regarded as condescending. Indeed, with its plenary
citizens’ assembly, Wajo seems to have come much closer than did early nineteenth-
century Britain to the classical Athenian ideal of participatory democracy.
We may add that in one important respect, namely the rights of women, the South
Sulawesi states stood well above either Greece, or Rome, or the Great Britain of
Brooke’s day. Crawfurd (1820, I, 74), writing twenty years before Brooke’s visit,
observed that among ‘the nations of Celebes,’ women ‘take an active concern in all
the business of life; they are consulted by the men on all public affairs, and frequently
raised to the throne, and that too when the monarchy is elective.’ Brooke himself
records of Wajo:
All the offices of state, including even that of aru matoah [ruler], are open to women; and
they actually fill the important post[s] of government, four out of the six great chiefs of
Wajo being at present females [our emphasis]. These ladies appear in public like the men;
ride, rule, and visit even foreigners, without the knowledge or consent of their husbands.
(Mundy 1848, 75)
Similar accounts of Bugis women in positions of political power can be found from
other periods. The earliest historically attested ruler of a South Sulawesi kingdom is
a woman: Wé Tékkéwanua, who ‘broke the long and split the broad’ and married out
her six children to important neighbouring settlements. Her rule in the early fifteenth
century is recalled as a time of peace and prosperity (Caldwell 1995, 408), and oral
traditions of her role in the expansion of agriculture in Soppeng persist to this day. The
phenomenon of Bugis female authority is addressed by Millar (1983), who argues that
in South Sulawesi, ascriptive status, acquired by both sexes equally from their parents,
was more important than gender in selection for political office.
The fact that women in South Sulawesi could hold high state office reflected a more
general equality of rights between the sexes. ‘The Wajo women,’ Brooke wrote, ‘enjoy
perfect liberty, and are free from all the restraints usually imposed by the Mahomedan
religion’ (Mundy 1848, 89). One might add that they were free also from the restraints
suffered by women in nineteenth-century Britain, where a married woman had little
means of divorce and her property (and earnings if she had any) belonged to her
husband. By contrast, Bugis women retained their own property, enjoyed a right to
divorce, and could head their own households (Mundy 1848, 74–75). However closely
or distantly nineteenth-century South Sulawesi proto-citizenship approximated classical
European models, it is clear that women shared in it much more completely than
women did in any Western system of citizenship earlier than the twentieth century.
Comparisons, caveats and conclusions
The comparison between precolonial South Sulawesi and European antiquity should
not be overstretched. The terminology of citizenship – or at least, what is retrospectively
identified as such – was more explicit in Greece and Rome than it ever became in
Sulawesi prior to the rise of Indonesian nationalism. Bugis and Makasar texts do not
seem to include a concept of integral political community comparable to the Athenian
polis or Roman civitas, encompassing both nobles and free commoners. At most they
refer vaguely to the pa’banua or ‘people of the land,’ a term which usually appears to
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include only ‘the ordinary members of the local community’ (Pelras 1996, 105). Nor did
the pa’banua have quite the same ideological role and importance as the Roman
populus or ‘people,’ described by Mouritsen (2015, 155) as ‘the only true source of
legitimacy in the Roman state.’ It must also be noted that while the statutory freedoms
of Wajo as enumerated by Noorduyn include judicial rights, they do not explicitly
include the right to political participation that is often regarded as the essence of
classical citizenship in Athens and the pre-Imperial Roman Republic.
Other contrasts between precolonial Sulawesi and classical Europe can be found in the
domain of law and justice. Rule of law was arguably just as important a principle for the
Bugis and Makasar peoples as it was in Greece or Rome. But in Sulawesi it was ade’ or
customary law (albeit recorded in written as well as oral form) rather than hukum or
statutory law that was important. The latoa, which itself contains a large body of
customary law, emphasizes that knowledge of ade’ is a basic requirement for adminis-
trative office. The legislative function of the assemblies of state was less developed than in
European antiquity, and the judicial apparatus was less independent of the executive and
less rooted in the political community as a whole. In Athens the legal system involved
citizen jurors on such a scale that the law courts ‘played a dominant role in the life of the
state’ and were ‘a way of life for many, perhaps most of the elderly citizens’ (Thorley
2004, 38). In Republican Rome, where criminal disputes were initially held in the
Centuriate Assembly, separate public courts were later introduced with magistrates like-
wise presiding over citizen jurors (albeit all from the propertied classes). In South
Sulawesi there is no evidence of such a participatory jury system, and although there
were senior officials known as pa’bicara with specialized judicial functions, these operated
very much within, rather than alongside of, the political hierarchy. As the founding
constitution of Sidenreng states: ‘If a pa’bicara rejects what has been decided by our lords
of Sidenreng [the ruling council] then he may be executed by the law’ (Druce 1999, 42).
The above-mentioned points of difference notwithstanding, we hope to have shown
that to compare the political institutions of precolonial South Sulawesi with those of
ancient Athens and Rome – that is, the historical models that have most strongly
inspired modern ideals and concepts of citizenship – is by no means an absurd
enterprise. As in Athens and Rome, government in South Sulawesi was collective or
collegial, decisions being taken and power exercised by councils of (near-) equals rather
than by autocrats. As in Athens and Rome, every non-slave in the polity effectively
enjoyed some right of participation in the political process, albeit not necessarily an
explicitly codified right, and in most cases exercised only occasionally (as in the case of
the plenary assemblies convened at times of elite disunity) or indirectly, via popular
representation in state councils. The system, in other words, was more like the Roman
Republic, with its representative and communal elements, than like Athenian democ-
racy with its uncompromising emphasis on direct citizen participation. The parallel
with Rome – and indeed, it might be argued, with the ‘oligarchic democracy’ of twenty-
first century Indonesia – is particularly strong with regard to the role of popular
assemblies in South Sulawesi as arbiters of intra-elite conflict.
The popular will of the Roman people found expression in the context [..] of divisions
within the oligarchy. Democratic politics in Rome was consequently a function of the
degree and type of competition in progress between oligarchic families, groups or
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individuals. It is simply a fact that the ruling class accepted the arbitration of popular
voting in certain extremely important circumstances [..]. (North 1990, 18)
As in both Athens and Rome, the democratic aspects of the South Sulawesi polity went
hand in hand with strong and institutionalized social stratification, with the outright
exclusion of slaves from the political community paradoxically heightening public
awareness of the value of liberty. As in both Athens and Rome, government was
contractual, legal, and constitutional in character, providing the (proto-) citizen with
clearly defined rights and freedoms.
As we noted at the outset, such a system of institutionalized rights and freedoms was
unusual in precolonial Indonesia. Brooke went so far as to claim that ‘amid all the
nations of the East [..] the Bugis alone have arrived at the threshold of recognized
rights, and have alone emancipated themselves from despotism’ (Mundy 1848, 65–66).
If Brooke’s claim may have been an exaggeration, there were undoubtedly aspects of the
history and geography of the region that were unusually conducive to the development
of institutionalized rights and freedoms. A brief, comparative glance at South Sulawesi
and the classical Mediterranean, where it can be argued that similar preconditions were
present, helps to illuminate these.
First, the regions in question were not (yet) conquered by foreign empires and
subjected to forcible political centralization. Nor were they (yet) influenced by
prestigious foreign religions or civilizations that provided ideological support for
political centralization – for instance by associating it, via divinely ordained king-
ship, with important new supernatural benefits. Instead, in both regions the institu-
tions of state developed on the basis of existing, decentralized local interests,
a process that favoured contractual and constitutional arrangements. Secondly, in
both cases, agricultural resources were rich enough to give rise to strongly stratified
societies, yet a maritime geography, featuring narrow peninsulas and long coastlines,
prevented particular elite groups and polities from dominating others to an inescap-
able extent by controlling natural choke points of commerce, such as the mouths of
major rivers. This preserved an element of pluralism, and indeed sometimes armed
conflict, among the emergent states that seems to have been important to the
evolution of their institutions. In precolonial South Sulawesi as in classical Europe,
the state’s constant need for the motivated military manpower which the common
people could provide gave the latter an important point of political leverage over
elites. In Wajo, as noted, it was only the ‘people’s tribunes’ who had the power to
summon the freemen to war; in early Rome, the institution of the tribuni plebis
seems to have been the result of an episode in which commoners refused to enroll in
the army, leaving the city defenceless against enemies (Balot 2017, 5). Finally, both
regions, again partly due to their maritime geography, were commercial in economic
orientation, as reflected in the inclusion of ius commercii as a key right of freemen
both in Rome and in Wajo.
Pelras (2000, 430) suggests that the prototype for the formal ‘social contracts’ which
developed under these conditions to underpin state formation among the Bugis was
provided by the informal, individual contract which, both then and in recent times,
unites leader and follower in a classic patron-client relationship, whereby a patron
provides various forms of protection and insurance to a client in return for service and
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obedience. In the relatively decentralized and competitive environment of precolonial
South Sulawesi, the voluntary element in such relationships was always strong.
The relationship between lord and follower was voluntary and could be ended at any time;
the lord could drop his follower if the latter was insufficiently obedient or if he did not
comply in his obligations towards him; conversely, a follower could move to another lord
if he felt that the previous one did not give him enough protection. (Pelras 2000, 398)
It was arguably this clientelistic principle of contractual power and hierarchy that, transposed
into a formal, collective agreement, provided the constitutional foundation of the South
Sulawesi states. The role of another indigenous institution, slavery, in shaping that constitu-
tion has already been noted: the necessarily unfree status of the slaves made it useful to define
the freedoms of the free, and possible to see the free population as a collectivity united by its
common rights. It is interesting to conclude by underlining the paradox that the pre-existing
local institutions that the peoples of South Sulawesi built on when they ‘emancipated
themselves from despotism’ and created ‘acknowledged rights of citizenship’ (Brooke’s
words again), included two institutions, clientelism and slavery, which from a modern
perspective appear fundamentally at odds both with freedom and with citizenship.
Notes
1. The official spelling of the provincial capital of South Sulawesi.
2. There were minor variations in these matters between the kingdoms and over time. For
example, it is not clear that in early Bone the arupitu (seven lords) had the power to elect
the arumpone (ruler).
3. Taxation, the other main duty usually incumbent upon citizens, appears to have been light
or non-existent (Mundy 1848, 64). However, a chronicle of Wajo describes the people of
Boli abandoning their village and fleeing the tax collectors of Luwu, a neighbouring
kingdom (Zainal Abidin. 1985, 64).
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